Imperial Twilight - The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age (Stephen Platt, 2018)

I liked this.  

Some overlap with recent book about Brits in India (some of the same folks, lots of trade, India is where the opium poppies were cultivated, etc.) Some of the same opportunism I associate with British adventurers in India.  Things not really planned, but aggressive action when the right excuse came along.

Opening section does a really nice job of bringing to life Macartney's initial trip to visit the Chinese emperor.  I've seen several renditions of this and enjoyed this author's the most.  Hard to imagine.  The "kowtow" kerfuffle, later used to justify aggression.

Explained the origins of the officially sanctioned trade in Canton; the factories; the fallback site in Portuguese Macao.

Chinese bureaucracy getting corrupted, with a few outstanding examples and then widespread problems.  Wasted lots of money putting down White Lotus rebellion (1790s or so).  This is not directly affecting Canton except the corruption issues spread in that direction as well.

A couple missionaries show up (Manning, Morrison); they are more aggressive about exploring China (one of them even went in via Tibet); this helps spark interest back in Britain.  Manning connected to Charles Lamb, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (always these small world stories in Brit-world),  First European to see Lhasa in a couple centuries.

China navy badly outdated, can't even control local pirates.  Brits well aware.

Useful discussion of the growth of the opium trade. It wasn't legitimate, not all firms participated. Author doesn't exonerate China - corrupt officials, users are making a decision as well - but overwhelming driver is Brit aggression as profits started rolling in. Jardine and Matheson as infamously venal, also constantly calling for British navy to attack - ugh.

It's interesting to see how much opposition to the opium trade was raised on the home front.  This was happening shortly after Britain outlawed slavery, and some of the successful antislavery folks turned to attacking the opium trade.

China wavering on policy; some argue to legalize and tax opium (similar discussions as today); the emperor finally decides on an aggressive crackdown (under Li's leadership).  Which is making some headway, surprisingly enough, perhaps would have worked pretty well.  But Li gets crossways with the Brits.  The government back home never seems to have much time to focus on China - this was a very minor backwater as far as Brit Empire matters went - but finally they decide to take action.  Parliamentary vote was very close, the Opium War (here focusing on the First Opium War, 1839-1842) almost didn't happen.

But once started - it took awhile, but outcome never in doubt.  China humiliated; Brits insist on a long list of concessions. This became a bigger issue once Chinese nationalism became more of a thing in the early 20th century - no doubt still used as a rallying cry. With some justification, it was not a pretty chapter.

The Black Swan - The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2007, 2010)

This builds upon "Fooled by Randomness" - some of the concepts reappear but in greater depth, and a lot new.

We evolved in East Africa (presumably) to handle a much simpler world - fewer sources of Black Swans - e.g. a new enemy, a new dangerous animal, a difficult weather change.  In that world one can make quick inferences and generally be largely correct.  Now there are many more sources and many take much longer to play out.

Similar - we automatically seek a cause for occurrences - helpful and efficient but significant risk of being misleading.  Initially valuable for efficiency in a simpler environment.

Similar - categorizing and classifying - much happens unconsciously, it seems.  Misleads all too often.

Similar - we love narratives and explanations - takes much more effort to store long strings of random information.  Our brains unconsciously summarize, theorize, simplify - evolved way of gaining efficiency - again, probably worked well in the long stage of evolution, involves more hazards now  

Positive and tiring effort is required to avoid these wired-in impulses. We can't consistently do so.  Keep reminding oneself.

Not being conscious that there are huge swaths of information outside of what we are aware of. However comprehensive we consider our knowledge to be on any given subject - it's pathetically incomplete.  Need to create the habit of keeping this in mind, would help drive humility as to what we do and can know.

We can often know with confidence that propositions are untrue.  We can seldom if ever know with confidence that propositions are true.  Remember this.

Difficulty or impossibility of identifying causation when looking backward. He mentions the popular business books and states in a better way the problem that caused me to stop reading them - a survivor company looking back in hindsight - even if not perniciously, it's made up.

Looking forward also difficult or impossible - forecaster track records are awful.  It's OK if one is aware of this! 

Futurist writers with the same problem - great at authoritatively telling why things happened a certain way in the past, present/future not so much - I wrote this in 2007 as losing interest in such writers.

He loves Montaigne. (Also here.)

Hayek.  Bottoms-up knowledge.

Off topic in a way, but Taleb adopted an unusual exercise and diet approach - aping primitive man, thinking so many years of evolution in that state suggested modern approaches aren't optimal.  I won't copy this.

It's a little frustrating to hear such a good explanation about limits of knowledge (and limits of knowing), but with little in the way of recommendations about what to do about this.  As well-received as the book was, apparently I'm not the only reader that felt this way.  This edition includes an ~80 page additional chapter through which Taleb took on this complaint . . . though in the end I didn't pick up much in the way of specific action items.  

The value is improving one's ability to keep an open mind, and one's overall approach to recognizing problems and humbly approaching the best response path while recognizing the limits of knowing and remaining flexible as new information filters in.

That's a lot of value.

[Writing about 1987 crash - no internet, we checked market status via phone in those days; not clear what happened or why recovery was so quick.  Later mentions LTCM collapse - Black-Scholes - client companies used their modeling to value stock options.  Big episodes for folks my age.]

Army of Empire - The Untold Story of the Indian Army in World War I (George Morton-Jack, 2018)

 (528 pages)

This was very much worth reading.  Not just for the role of the Indian Army in WWI (highly interesting for various reasons if not highly affecting the outcome), but for what it reveals about British policy of the times, the evolving Indian independence movement of the times, life in the villages from which the British drew recruits, etc.

Britain continuing to rely on Indians for military personnel in the prewar years . . . but aggressively maintaining "prestige" to keep them in their place.  Also a color barrier existed - Indians were not allowed to fight against white armies anywhere in the Commonwealth (what if they succeeded?!)  Let alone become officers with any form of authority over whites.  Selection by race, not merit.

Most of the recruits were drawn from select villages in northern India; many (Afridi, Pashtun) from loosely-organized territories outside British India (these areas functioning like buffer states between British India and places like Afghanistan).  The Afridi/Pashtun types were, and definitely considered themselves to be, independent of British India - and so behaved sometimes when serving in the Indian army.

Some British Army leaders foresaw the coming conflict, and prepared even the Indian army to assist.  Thus they were in position to land Indian troops at a critical juncture of 1914 - before the trenches were developed, just as France and Britain were running out of troops to stand up against German units still trying to break through in the initial drive to Paris.  The presence of those Indian troops - even if they didn't end up with lots of fighting - was essential in plugging the weak points.  Then the Western front settled into years of trench warfare.

Some of those troops were cavalry - and used in charges in a few instances - over time they figured out how to somewhat effectively support ground troops following "softening up" bombardments.

Indian troops were kept in Europe for years in many instances; it seems that they were well treated by the French citizenry in particular.  This was an eye-opener as compared to treatment by the Brits.

I don't want to sound too negative toward the Brits - I think the author does a pretty balanced job on this topic - many of the Brit officers were really good about how they treated their men.  But still.

I also thought the author did a good job exploring the mixed feeling of various of the Indians serving the British.  Genuine loyalty mixed with the primary driver - serving in the Army was a pretty good job for those recruited, and they were able to help the folks back home.  The Indian independence movement didn't have all that much traction as yet - folks like Gandhi were early in the process - and folks recruited from villages into the Indian army were mostly unaware of "independence" as a concept.

While some of the Indian troops - especially those with lesser preparation - were ineffective, the author points out that the Indian army - due to action in various skirmishes or engagements around the British empire - had greater experience than many or most of its European counterparts. They were not struggling "fish out of water" as the artillery boomed - they had seen versions of this, if smaller scale. 

Something I hadn't appreciated - Indian units fought all over the world during WWI. Heavy action in Iraq.  Chasing Germans around East Africa. Gallipolli.  Palestine (including encounters with "Lawrence of Arabia" - who had unfriendly encounters with their officers).  Minor forays into Afghanistan.

Indians transferred from the Western front often were unhappy about this - they enjoyed being in France.

Significant number of Muslim soldiers - this was a touchy subject as fighting occurred in Iraq (Ottoman emperor as caliph, after all).

Lots of change among those who served outside India - they came back with different views - but still tended to remain participants in the Indian army - resentful of some of the mistreatment, but the compensation remained attractive and they had been through a lot of shared experiences alongside their white officers.  Independence movement slow to gain traction among this group.

Amritsar massacre in 1919 - mostly Indian troops firing at the order of their white officers.  Led to repressive steps.

Folks like Gandhi had supported Indians fighting in WWI based on promises that this cooperation would hasten independence after the war ended.  Disillusionment, the transition to a more confrontational (though nonviolent for Gandhi and his group) style.