"To compensate a little for the treachery and weakness of my memory, so extreme that it has happened to me more than once to pick up again, as recent and unknown to me, books which I had read carefully a few years before . . . I have adopted the habit for some time now of adding at the end of each book . . . the time I finished reading it and the judgment I have derived of it as a whole, so that this may represent to me at least the sense and general idea I had conceived of the author in reading it." (Montaigne, Book II, Essay 10 (publ. 1580))

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

The Day of Battle - The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (Rick Atkinson, 2007)

This book had quite a bit of attention when published in 2007. I liked it quite a bit. First time I've read in any degree of detail about the Italy campaign. That part of WWII in general seems overlooked (in comparison to e.g. Normandy).

A motivation for learning more about this is the participation of my uncle, Irvin Bormann, in this part of the war. He was killed in one of the major Cassino dustups. Reading the book, it's a wonder any of those guys survived some of the things they were asked to do. Much of the Allied attack strategy seemed like World War I (moreso than anything else I've read about WWII); high-casualty largely frontal attacks on entrenched positions.

The overall impression was that this was just an extremely difficult slog with a number of factors making things very tough. Such as:

1. Germans in 1943 and early 1944 still had quite a bit of firepower left in them. (Diminishing resources, but far less of the young boys/old men problems later into 1944 and into 1945.)

2. Italian terrain is a tough place to make war. There always is another line of mountains as you make your way north. Germans were always well prepared, well dug in. Few roads or open routes through which tanks could get involved; attacks were funneled through defined routes where the Germans had a relatively easy time inflicting casualties.

3. Americans were forced to attack in part to draw Nazi resources off the Eastern Front and away from Western Europe (Normandy invasion planning was in full swing and Italy was viewed mostly as a diversion.)

4. The attacking was extra difficult because taking on established uphill positions required lots of resources. And guess what - resources were being diverted to Normandy (men, ships, etc.). (This led to a big shortage of landing craft for Anzio that contributed directly to the problems there.)

5. To sustain the pressure/diversion, the Allies kept trying to push forward in winter. Something even Hannibal and other classical campaigners never tried to do. Constant rain, cold - just miserable conditions.

6. Lots of confusion about the real goals in the campaign, weak cooperation between Americans and British.

Patton had a key role in taking Sicily; I didn't realize this was where the slapping incident occurred that put him on the shelf for awhile.

Discussion of difficult Salerno landing; rivalries and distrust with British Eighth Army; up to Naples and to onto the Gustav line (including in particular Cassino, where things bogged down). Click to enlarge the map for a good summary.

Anzio was supposed to draw off Nazis to enable the Gustav line (and Cassino) to be breached - but one of the big attacks on Cassino was launched when things weren't really ready so as to keep the Germans occupied and permit the Anzio beachhead to be established in the first place. This was the tail wagging the dog. The description of this part of the Cassino battle is almost heartbreaking, one of the bloodiest episodes for Americans anywhere in the entire war. Sent to cross the Rapido River with Germans dominating the heights across the river with a clear field of fire (and no pressure brought to bear on the German positions) - awful casualties without getting so much as a toehold across the river.

Another big - and failed - assault on Cassino in the January 25 - February 12 timeframe. Yes, the timing of these efforts to take Cassino correspond to the date where Irvin was killed.

Finally enough materiel and men were amassed to break through, starting May 11. Better weather had arrived. Polish and Moroccan units were effective. They finally broke out of Anzio around May 23. After that it was onto Rome; Fifth Army (Mark Clark obsession) arrived June 4-5. A big achievement immediately upstaged by D-Day.

Discussion of the debate whether to destroy the abbey; the author pretty clearly thinks this was unnecessary except perhaps that the regular soldiers had developed a belief in the importance of destroying the abbey and it was affecting morale. Destruction of the abbey didn't help a bit, probably made things worse because the Germans now occupied the ruins.

There is a really compelling story at the end where one of the key leaders (Truscott) gives a speech at the beachhead cemetery at Anzio (picture below). He turned his back to the audience and spoke to the dead. Who can imagine this?

Interesting, the Moroccans apparently were pretty effective fighters. This author's description of their behavior with the local female populace corresponded with the Sophia Loren movie (Two Women) of 1961.

Ernie Pyle and Bill Mauldin were strong presences.

Sounds like the battle among the local partisans, Nazi sympathizers, side-switchers, etc. resembled behavior in the Balkans (and elsewhere, I suppose).

The author writes how the American troops were hardening over time; less likely to take prisoners as time went on . . .

Something interesting was the countless references to the classics as the Allies moved out of North Africa, into Sicily, and up the Italian boot - Aeneid, Odyssey (Cyclops, Sirens); Horace; Hannibal; Caesar; on and on.

I thought the author was pretty balanced. For example, he talked about the failure to pursue opportunity at Anzio, but pointed out the high risk of an under-supplied group breaking out with a long unprotected flank. Etc.

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