A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (Victor Davis Hanson, 2005)

It was easy to see why this book has received so many glowing reviews. It constantly presents interesting ideas. And reinforces the notion that so very little has changed over the course of the centuries since (and preceding) this war.

Plus I finally was able to straighten out some basic geography about Attica (surrounding Athens), Corinth, and the Peloponnesian peninsula itself (Spartan territory). And the timetable for famous folks such as Aristophanes, Socrates etc. - the outburst of artists and philosophers probably made possible by the immense trading wealth of Athens created prior to a concerned (agrarian, conservative, sitting on large helot class) Sparta making the preemptive strike that kicked off the war.

Athens (under Pericles) had an interesting strategy - outlast Sparta by avoiding direct confrontation with the elite Spartan hoplites, and rely on city walls (including the long walls to Piraeus) plus incoming tribute from satellite states to keep things going. The author thinks this would have worked but for the devastating plague experienced early in the 30+ year conflict, which drastically reduced Athenian manpower, killed Pericles, and had a strong psychological impact.

The war had a large number of modern elements - including the realization that it was very important to inflict direct pain on the non-combatants who supported the military effort. Athens wouldn't engage Sparta in large-scale hoplite conflict, and Sparta wouldn't engage Athens in a large-scale naval battle. So a great deal of energy was expended ravaging the countryside, attacking (and punishing) cities, etc. This change from traditional tactics was decried by Socrates/Plato and many others.

Athens had extreme democracy - all citizens (well - except women, slaves, etc.) - could vote. Which led to great influence by demagogues. (Sounds familiar.)

Cavalry was almost a hobby element - hoplite/infantry courage was considered the most admirable. Only rich folks could afford horses, and they fluttered about the perimeter of battles for the most part (most Grecian territory wasn't suitable for horse maneuvering). Then came the battles on Sicily - open country, devastating cavalry.

Neither side was very effective at breaking through city walls - this wasn't a traditional element of Greek fighting.

The author says cavalry types were maybe 5'6", 120 pounds - riding what we would consider to be small ponies. No stirrups.

Lots of interesting discussion about trireme warfare, how it might have felt to be an oarsmen, etc. Lots of skill was involved - a key Athenian advantage. Triremes were limited - had to stop on land each night to forage for provisions. Very expensive to build and maintain.

Things fell apart for Athens on the ill-fated attack on Syracuse - otherwise it may have achieved stalemate notwithstanding the plague.

Things were never the same following this war - a weakened Greece eventually was susceptible to the brilliance of the Macedonians (Philip and his son, Alexander the Great).